THE COAST GUARD'S COMING OF AGE THE NEW NORMALCY OF MARITIME HOMELAND SECURITY
September 11, 2001 was this nation's second "date which will live in infamy". 1 The events in New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania that unfolded on television and over the radio will mark a generation, as did the Shuttle disaster, the assassination of President Kennedy, and Pearl Harbor. The date will also be a date that marks a fundamental change in the way that America looks at her security. As was the case with Pearl Harbor, the security blanket that had covered the United States was ripped apart by a horrifying surprise attack. A tear in the nation's defense fabric was exposed. Americans no longer live under the illusory security blanket that has comforted them for so long.
The terrorist attacks were envisioned, although few really believed they could occur.
Several national commissions gave warnings of a high probability of terrorist attacks within the near future, specifically predicting that "a direct attack against American citizens on American soil is likely over the next quarter century." 2 President Clinton went so far as to declare war on terrorism in late 1998.3 Somehow, it just didn't catch. Neither the Congress nor the populace at large acknowledged the predicted vulnerability of the strongest nation on earth. The United States was defenseless against the simplest of means of attack -a benign instrument of our own transportation system, an airplane. Captain Tony Regalubuto, U. S. Coast Guard, testified recently at a Congressional Hearing on Port Security that one of the biggest lessons learned from the attack is that "the nature of the threat facing all nations has changed dramatically. What we saw was new; hijackers taking over commercial flights for the sole purpose of turning them into guided weapons of mass destruction." 4 Before the attacks, several government agencies had gathered bits and pieces of information that if synthesized correctly may have predicted the tragic event. Instead, we witnessed a failure of the deterrence and detection systems designed to ward off such events and a lethargic intercept of the attack. It is curious to note that one of the first decisive actions taken by the federal government was the Department of Transportation's decision to shut down the air transportation system in the United States within minutes of the first airplane strike. Where were the defenders of the Homeland? Who was minding the shop? Who was putting the threat picture together?
Since the September 1 1th attacks, the federal government, in cooperation with several private think tanks, has scrutinized the ability of the government to counter asymmetric attacks such as those already experienced. The vulnerability of the country's maritime system -which includes 361 ports, 95,000 miles of coastline, and thousands of miles in inland rivers and Intracoastal waterways -has long been subject of discussion. Even more attention has been drawn to maritime security as a result of the September 11"' infiltration of air security. The maritime transportation system -given the openness of our ports; the myriad of small, unchecked inlets; and the length of unobserved inland waterways -was readily identified as one of the most critical U. S. security vulnerabilities. Entry points to the United States, key infrastructure, and nodal points of the maritime transportation system responsible for 90% of the nation's import/export trade are ripe for exploitation from asymmetric attack.
Constructing a sea defense on a 24-hour basis for a maritime country such as the United States is both impractical and unsustainable. The best protection of the maritime borders lies in a robust intelligence gathering, fusing, and dissemination system. Only such a system will enable the nation to make the most of its limited maritime defense resources to protect specific targets and establish a credible system capable of deterring, detecting, and intercepting intruders.
This study analyzes defense of the homeland from a maritime perspective. It will also address the rising importance of Maritime Homeland Security, describe functions the Department of Defense presently performs in defending the maritime border, and assess the Coast Guard's current and future 'deter, detect, and intercept' role on a post-September 1 11h security and defense environment. As September 1It is proving to be a significant turning point in our nation's history, so will it prove to be a critical event in the history of the U. S.
Coast Guard.
HOMELAND SECURITY -A DEFINITION
Several definitions of Homeland Security exist. The term has also been confused with Homeland Defense in the recent past. The interchangeability of these two terms and the resulting confused sense of their real meanings are prevalent. While the 'term' Homeland Defense still appears in many publications, current proposed or functioning definitions of Homeland Security are inclusive of Homeland Defense. In that vein, this paper will use term Homeland Security vice Homeland Defense except when referring to historical perspectives.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), in anticipation of its future role in Homeland Security, has proposed the following definition. 5
Homeland Security: the preparation for, prevention of, deterrence of, preemption of, defense against, and response to threats and aggression directed towards U.S. territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and infrastructure; as well as crisis management, consequence management, and other domestic civil support. 6 From the maritime perspective, the Coast Guard defines Homeland Security in terms of its maritime mission as follows:
The United States must have the means to deter, detect, intercept, and respond (emphasis added) to asymmetric threats, acts of aggression and attacks by terrorists on American homeland while maintaining our freedom and sustaining the flow of commerce. 7 The JCS definition is strikingly similar to the Coast Guard definition; however neither definition specifically identifies Homeland Defense as a separate entity. The JCS definition, by its nature, is oriented towards defense without forsaking its traditional commitment to civil support. It also has both a domestic and global dimension. On the other hand, the Coast Guard definition is oriented domestically and arguably aligned with its established civil authorities.
Although an essential component of Homeland Security, a detailed study of the quality and efficiency of event response is beyond the scope of this paper. The construct for response to terrorist attacks, outlined in Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39, specifically identifies the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as the lead agency for consequence management and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as the lead federal agency for crisis management. Definitions for each are as follows:
Crisis Management includes measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism. 8
Consequence Management includes measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism. 9 Crisis Management thus includes a preventative role for the FBI in thwarting a terrorist event, not solely a response role. However, the preventative role pertains only to "... legal deterrence in the form of not allowing terrorism to interfere with the prosecution, process, and ceasing certain activities that allow terrorist cells to flourish." 10 Additionally, the FBI only becomes involved actually in prevention if a potential terrorist threat is positively identified.
FEMA, on the other hand, takes the same approach to response regardless of the cause and dovetails consequence management protocols for terrorist events with those already established for natural or non-terrorist man-made disasters. 1
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The U.S. lacks the robust structure to implement of all four elements of Maritime Homeland Security. First, several agencies are involved in, but do not have a consistent understanding of, the requirements for conducting the 'deter, detect, and intercept' portions of the Maritime Homeland Security definition. Second, a Maritime Homeland Security strategy cannot be constructed until maritime entities identify existing security gaps. This task is complicated acknowledging the very different restrictions between the military and civil authority in filling those gaps without violating the Constitution. Third, the methodology for filling the Maritime Homeland Security gaps and identification of the acting authority (military, civilian, or both) has not been assigned. Finally, what role should the Coast Guard fill in the emerging strategy.
To further address these issues, let's consider a full description of the 'deter, detect, and intercept' strategy.
DETERRENCE
Webster defines deterrence as "the methods of preventing or discouraging from acting especially by means of doubt and fear." From a military perspective, Joint Pub 1-02 describes it as "the prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable consequences." 12 The Coast Guard construct for deterrence from a maritime perspective manifests as "prevention measures to protect U.S. interests including its population, armed forces, critical infrastructure, and important American historic and symbolic landmarks." 1 3 All definitions speak of a cost to an offending party resulting from undesirable action.
There are generally three types of deterrents. One type of deterrence, static deterrence, consists of the domestic laws and regulatory requirements involving a consequence manifested by loss of financial means or liberties. The United States has a plethora of deterrence-based laws and regulations in place, sponsored by several regulatory agencies. Such regulations ensure compliance or discourage action a vast majority of the time and are effective for a large majority of the U. S. citizens and visitors to this country.
The second type of deterrence is kinetic deterrence and consists of active enforcement of laws. Police on patrol, the Coast Guard conducting overflights of the maritime approaches, and active defense radar are examples of this type of deterrence.
Static deterrence focuses on keeping unwanted actions from occurring while kinetic.
deterrence assumes a failure of static deterrence, possibly by asymmetric means. An asymmetric breech in deterrence structure occurs when willful violators navigate past both static and kinetic deterrence and act at will.
A third type of deterrence, preemptive deterrence, involves specific actions that deter by preempting undesirable actions. PDD 39 describes a form of active terrorist deterrence as follows:
... the disruption of terrorist-sponsored activity including termination of financial support, arrest and punishment of terrorists as criminals, application of U.S. laws and new legislation to prevent terrorist groups from operating in the United States, and application of extraterritorial statutes to counter acts of terrorism and apprehend terrorists outside of the United States. 1 4 This directive proposes overt actions, akin to military tactics such as flexible deterrent operations, designed to preempt undesirable actions. While the military naturally would focus on using all elements of national power as deterrent actions, it is likely that civil authorities, including the Coast Guard, would rely mainly on civil authority concurrent with its domestic jurisdiction to conduct its deterrent actions.
DETECTION
Deterrents can and often fail. This was the case in the September 11 th attacks. The civil deterrence mechanisms failed to stop actions that led to a cataclysmic event.
Intelligence indicators produced no credible warning, and therefore no preemptive deterrent options were outlined or executed. In cases such as these, when all deterrence fails, the importance of swift and decisive detection of deterrence failures becomes paramount. In cases involving weapons of mass destruction, the early and unambiguous detection of aggressive action must be sufficiently aggressive to initiate action to protect vital national interests and critical infrastructure. A vibrant intelligence network that quickly fuses information from a multitude of sources, identifies a threat, and quickly transmits the threat to enforcement personnel, must provide the foundation of detecting deterrence failures.
Without a smart intelligence gathering and fusion system, events are likely to occur without a chance to sortie resources to intercept and defeat.
A post September 11 th review of the intelligence system revealed gaps in the domestic and intemational systems of intelligence collection, analysis, and sharing. Ideally, the probability of an event's occurrence is formed from information that is collected, processed, coalesced, fused, and disseminated. With luck, resources mobilized once a certain probability threshold is crossed, counters the identified threat and restores a nominal security level. However, proper analysis requires large numbers of people with access and capability to sift through the mountains of seemingly insignificant bits of information to piece together a scenario and assign a probability of a deterrence failure.
Unfortunately, detection systems and probability thresholds, if they exist at all, differ from agency to agency within the federal government. Few, if any, attain the nimbleness to communicate the imminent threat to the appropriate interception resources in a timely manner.
INTERCEPTION
Interception is the "use of resources to anticipate, prevent and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism or aggression."' 6 The laws of the United States assign primary authority to the federal government to protect the homeland and its citizens by responding to such acts.
In many ways, interception is the last line of action before a threat materializes into a catastrophic event, triggering the Consequence Management response.
The Coast Guard, as well as other law enforcement agencies, understand this concept from a maritime perspective and readily recognize that credible awareness and detection are useless without effective interception capability. "Based on intelligent targeting, [these] agencies must be outfitted with the tools to interdict suspicious people or cargo, thereby disrupting the chain of events leading up to catastrophic terrorist attack on the American homeland." 1 7
ANALYSIS OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Orchestrating all four parts of the Homeland Security definition is necessary to ensure full spectrum security and is lacking throughout the Federal, State, and local government agencies. Analysis of the gaps in orchestration is offered.
First, robust response organizations and partnerships, to shape the crisis and consequence management portions, exist in only a few municipalities across the country. Civil order erodes when people or systems stray from the rule of law. United States statutes are designed to prosecute and punish offenders; it is not an effective deterrent against entities acting asymmetrically as those on September 11•. Such actions go beyond the expectation of rational people and bridge the abyss between civil disobedience and acts of war. Legislated deterrence does not always work as an effective security system, especially for irrational people. Therefore, the ability to 'detect and intercept' deterrence failures before they manifest into acts of terror, is essential for a full spectrum security system.
Irrational people exist and act asymmetrically. No deterrence system is foolproof against these actors. The nation's 'detect and intercept' system, proved weak during the September 1ll attacks. Assuming the deterrence in place were sufficient, the 'detection and interception' of the threat was not. From the perspective of Homeland Security, maritime included, these two capabilities of the security system are woefully inadequate in the present asymmetric global security environment. Although beyond the scope of this study, MDA will eventually play an important role in ensuring the air security of the U. S.
MARITIME HOMELAND SECURITY
The Preamble to the Constitution clearly alludes to the basic principle of defending the United States and providing for its security by requiring Congress to "provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States." 27 The preponderance of the nation's physical defense lies on the shoulders of the nation's armed services under the consolidated general administration of DOD. The National Security Strategy specifies the objective of "enhancing security at home and abroad." 28 The NSS further identifies as a vital national interest the physical security of our territory and that of our allies, the safety or our citizens both at home and abroad, protection against WMD proliferation .... and the protection of the nation's critical infrastructure -including energy, banking and finance, telecommunications, transportation, water systems, vital human services, and government services -from disruption intended to cripple their operation." Before the events of September 11, 2001, DOD tacitlyaccepted its role in the internal defense of the homeland critical infrastructure, even while assigning it a lesser priority.
Of the programs laid out by DOD, none pertain directly to the maritime realm. Rather they focus on assistance to civil authorities, limited preventative assistance to cyber attack, and training to civil authorities to prepare for consequence management response. Few programs focus on the 'deter, detect, and intercept' triad of Homeland Security. NORAD is a notable exception, since it has the capability to deter and detect conventional hostile aerospace forces. However, NORAD has no capability to track unfriendly maritime traffic or coordinate an intercept. At present, our maritime borders are open to the free flow of goods and people. The maritime border alone consists of 361 navigable ports and over 95,000 miles of open coastline. The nation's maritime transportation system includes more than 1,000 harbor channels, 25,000 miles of Intracoastal and coastal waterways, and 3,700 passenger and cargo terminals.
Successfully performing the 'detect and intercept' phases of Maritime Homeland Security over such a broad expanse of territory and users requires a creative effort combining the civil and military authorities and capabilities to engage in the full spectrum of Homeland Security scenarios. The future construct requires flexibility to shift quickly and confidently from low threat to high threat, while protecting the rights afforded by the Constitution. A historical review of how the nation addressed maritime security and defense provides a perspective on the difficulty in creating such a construct.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF MARITIME HOMELAND SECURITY

U. S. NAVY'S ROLE
For the greater part of the first 200 years of our nation's existence, maritime threats to our Homeland Security stemmed from foreign navies having the capacity to project forces upon U. S. shores. The relative safety enjoyed by the U.S., due to its geopolitical isolation, minimized the threat from the maritime realm. Up until the 1930s, the nation built and manned great fortresses along the coastal U.S. to 'deter, detect and intercept' maritime incursions with hostile fire and counterattack. These fortresses were the nation's first line of defense for potentially hostile naval forces which could pop-up over the horizon, a mere 18-30 miles from land depending on the eye height above sea level of the fortress watchman.
The U.S. Navy was initially built to counter these threats as our country fought for its independence. After the Revolutionary War, we faced no overt threats from the sea. The young republic did not have the economic might to support a standing Navy. Therefore, in 1785, the Navy was disestablished. In 1793, American vessels were trading essentially unprotected from raiding nations and pirates of the Barbary Powers. 30 To protect American trade, President Washington implored Congress to reauthorize the Navy. After much debate, Congress finally authorized "the procurement of six frigates"31 in January of 1794.
From these meager beginning would grow the greatest sea power ever known. After two World Wars, the U. S. Navy has become the undisputed ruler on, above, and below the sea.
As the Navy grew stronger in its force projection capability, the maritime isolation of the United States from conventional forces also increased due to an expanded security buffer.
This isolation was further enhanced with the development of coastal radar, spaced-based intelligence systems, and land-based fighter interceptor aircraft -all of which rendered maritime attack on the United States unattainable.
During the same time, the U.S. close-in naval defenses were ironically weakening.
Radar and the airplanes became the ascendant military weapons for coastal protection. as Coast Artillery units were converted into antiaircraft artillery units. While this formulation was acceptable to 'detect and intercept' conventional warring armadas intending to attack the homeland, it did nothing to 'detect and intercept' unconventional and asymmetric threats. Therefore, the service does have a wartime mission, albeit a less defined function than those of the other armed services. By law, during time of war and by Presidential direction, the Coast Guard becomes part of the Navy as a force. 36 The Coast Guard gained both peacetime and wartime responsibility for port security from passage of the Espionage Act and the Ports and Waterway Safety Act (PWSA) 37 . As a function of these two laws, Captains of the Port enforce safety and security within their areas of responsibility. Jurisdiction of the laws applies to port areas, inland waters and coastal areas seaward to three miles. 39 The Coast Guard had not been mandated to perform military actions in the coastal zone as a primary responsibility. The Navy had retained this mandate since its reformation in 1794. Rarely were cutters outfitted in peacetime to jump directly into wartime missions, including those involving low-intensity conflict. Instead, cutters were Semper Paratus to be quickly adapted to specialized missions as required by the "Naval Component Commander." Providing specialized capabilities, or adapting to specialized maritime missions, the Coast Guard stood as a force-in-waiting.
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The early functions of the Department of the Navy, other than fighting the nation's wars at sea, included anti-commerce-raider operations, protection of shipping, raids against hostile nations, blockades, and ground force support fires. According to today's doctrine, most of these actions would align with those of the Coast Guard. Over time, the Navy focused on its 'blue water' wartime mission, while the Coast Guard focused on its safety and security mission. As the nation became engaged in world conflicts, the Navy's surface, subsurface, and aerial expeditionary war-fighting capabilities grew. Force projection capabilities improved, and the Navy grew until essentially it became the master of maritime high intensity conflict at and from the sea. However, the Coast Guard had no defined role in Homeland Defense. Instead, the responsibility for Maritime Homeland Defense was shuffled between Naval Yards, Naval Districts, Naval Coastal Frontiers, and Naval Sea Frontier Commands. These commands were the defense dujour, depending on the perceived threat to the homeland from the sea.
The Navy grew more focused on establishing global presence and continuing the push for domination of the seas based upon the theories of Mahan.4 As such, Maritime Homeland Defense was rarely a priority for the Navy.
In early 1980, Naval Districts were disestablished and the responsibility of Maritime
Homeland Defense today rest with the Navy Fleet Commander-in-Chiefs (CinCs), Atlantic and Pacific.
* As a reminder, the term Homeland Security did not exist until recently.
MARITIME DEFENSE ZONES
Since World War II, the design of the Navy fleet tended towards the blue water, power projection missions. Ships built during the period boasted capability that did not suit them for the shallow water, low-intensity conflict missions. The Navy grew to a maximum of 600 vessels during the height of the Cold War. These vessels were equipped and trained to project force in keeping with the Department of Navy's vision that focused on expeditionary force projection.
The Navy needed then, and still needs today, vessels to meet the mission requirement of Naval Coastal Warfare (NCW). However, during the Cold War build up, the service paid much less emphasis to the NCW mission. 45 The condition and expertise of the U. S. Navy's mine warfare capability offers current evidence of how far away from naval coastal warfare operations the Navy's focus has strayed. The present capability is surpassed by many of our allies. Naval officers perceive assignment to a mine warfare unit as a career-ending move.46 Although fully recognized as a weakness, the mine warfare mission cannot compete against the high profile of large force projection systems. From time to time, thoughts of merging the coastal warfare functions with the Coast Guard's longtime experience and professionalism in coastal operations have emerged, only to be dismissed from lack of political resolve.
COAST GUARD AS A WAR-FIGHTING PLAYER
Maritime Defense Zones (MARDEZ) were created in 1984, on the heels of a Coast
Guard Wartime Missions Study, with recommendations by and approval of the Navy-Coast Guard Board. 47 Current doctrine for maritime defense of the homeland refers to these zones. Their creation was an attempt to leverage the expanding deficiency in the Navy's NCW capabilities while tasking the Coast Guard with a continual wartime mission. Unfortunately, the United States homeland, at a moment in its history when it needs it most, does not have a workable maritime defense structure. The question remains, "What construct is necessary to ensure the Homeland is defended 'against all enemies, both foreign and domestic?'" 54 A simple ends, ways, and means analysis leads to a solution.
[Ends] The nation needs to protect itself from hostile actions against and within its borders (maritime inclusive). This is supported by both the National Security Strategy and the Constitution.
[Ways] A viable force that can operate in the maritime environment must be able to 'detect and intercept' hostile actions and threats as they arise. This function has been shared, somewhat convolutedly, between the Coast Guard and the Navy for over two hundred years. The current construct for the maritime defense is not workable for a variety of reasons already addressed. It failed to materialize at the exact moment for which it was designed on September 11th.
[Means] Responsibility for coastal defense must be streamlined into a single entity that can respond using multiple elements of national power with a focus on improving the 'detect and intercept' portions of Maritime Homeland Security. The Coast Guard fills all of these roles, but presently lacks the means to operate in the low-intensity conflict realm as a military element of national power. The Navy has forfeited most of its capability to operate effectively in the low-intensity conflict realm, and has no direct authority to intervene in domestic civilian matters.
Domestically, the Coast Guard presently offers a large part of the solution for Maritime
Homeland Security. As depicted in Figure 1 , the elemental phases of Maritime Homeland
Security are shown to intersect with the missions of the Coast Guard. The missions in themselves represent a majority of the elements of National Power from a domestic perspective.
The complexities of the missions, in the context of Homeland Security, reveal the Coast Guard as a multi-mission, multi-element enforcer of National Power in the coastal maritime domain.
The glaring deficiency is in the 'detect and intercept' intersection as shown in the boxed area of This construct of information sharing, fusion, and dissemination is the foundation for the 'new normalcy'; the new status quo in the maritime environment. Not addressed is the 'detect and intercept' posture in the higher levels of maritime security or the low-intensity conflict arenas.
Appropriate levels of 'detect and intercept' will naturally vary by the level of threat.
September 1 1th events created the 'new normalcy'. It is a normalcy where nothing is unthinkable and where America "continually and relentlessly protects its citizens and vital national security and economic infrastructure against unpredictable terrorists attacks." 57 As such, the Coast Guard has defined three maritime security (MARSEC) conditions that help determine the necessary levels of 'detect and intercept' to be activated based, on the perceived threat. They are as follows:
MARSEC I -heightened awareness that a threat exists to the U.S. exploiting open access to the Maritime Transportation Network. MARSEC 2 -increased risk level either due to specific intelligence of potential enemy activity or increased vulnerability. This MARSEC employs a 'point defense' philosophy.
MARSEC 3 -higher risk than MARSEC 2, where specific threats exist to the U.S. maritime domain are identified. 58
Responding to these threat levels falls well within the Maritime Security mission of the Coast Guard. However, it is uncertain how such responses relate to the national defense mission. First, the 'detect and intercept' construct outlined above works in the peacetime environment, but does not satisfy the need to fill the coastal maritime defense void. Second, the construct focuses on the ports and viability of the navigable waterways structure. This is a valid concern, consistent with the Coast Guard's mobility mission. However, it does not address potential incursions to the homeland from small, relatively non-vital ports and over 95,000 miles of unprotected coastline. It must be remembered that the September 1 1t
terrorists entered the country not through large international airports, but through small, low security regional airports. Small ports, close to neighboring North American countries with weaker customs and immigration enforcement, could compromise border integrity.
Moreover, anyone who takes a drive down the coasts of Texas, Florida, North Carolina, or
Maryland will note the long stretches of uninhabited and unprotected beaches accessible to any small vessel. The myriad of swamps and marshes along the Louisiana coast as well as the more than 4,000 oil rigs and production platforms in the Gulf of Mexico 59 also offer willing terrorists a number of accesses to the homeland interior, as well as access to U.S.
vital interests. In short, as would be necessitated in a wartime posture, a maritime screen of the United States would be extremely difficult for any agency to construct with current capabilities.
THE WAY AHEAD -MARITIME HOMELAND SECURITY
The breadth of maritime threats, and the lack of asset organization for assuring fullspectrum maritime security, begs for a military command structure that can operate in both peacetime and wartime security environments. [T]he Homeland Security Council is still wrestling with that [Coast Guard role] issue as well as defining the roles and missions of the entire command. Options to appoint a Coast Guard admiral as the deputy head of Northern Command, are being assessed. Another issue is how to link Northern Command to the nation's border security entities, which are part of other departments and not part of the Pentagon's chain-of-command. How the Coast Guard will integrate with Northern Command is being sorted through, since its part of the Department of Transportation and not DoD. 6 5 The Navy also supports a future role for the Coast Guard within NORTHCOM. VADM Clark, Chief of Naval Operations recently stated:
What we need in the maritime domain is similar to what we have in the air defense domain; and that is, fundamentally, we need a maritime NORAD .... I am convinced that responsibility for [this maritime mission] should rest first and foremost with the United States Coast Guard.... I'm also convinced that there is a role for the United States Navy to play in response and in support of the Coast Guard, bringing our resources to bear wherever they are required. 6 How the Coast Guard will ultimately integrate within a unified command such as NORTHCOM will depend on functional changes as well as improvements to the Coast Guard's infrastructure and operating capital. Approval and funding of the Coast Guard Deepwater air, shore, and sea asset re-capitalization program will improve its ability to 67 perform a national defense mission. However, if the Coast Guard is to provide the maritime security capabilities as well as ability to conduct low-intensity conflict in the coastal zone, the Deepwater program will fall short of the full Naval Coastal Warfare Doctrine requirements. Anti-submarine warfare, mine countermeasures, and explosive ordnance details are still part of the Navy's war chest. These issues have not been discussed in light of the pending changes to the Unified Command Plan. It is true that the Navy could chop these assets to the NORTHCOM Maritime Component Commander (i.e., Coast Guard) or any other CinC in a force-providing role. However, this arrangement is too close to the failed MARDEZ concept of asset-sharing and becomes troublesome as we contemplate the array of CinC's that could use low-intensity conflict assets such as these. 
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. These attacks may involve weapons of mass destruction and weapons of mass disruption. As porous as U. S. physical borders are in an age of burgeoning trade and travel, its "cyber borders" are even more porous -and the critical infrastructure upon which so much of the U. S. economy depends can now be targeted by non-state and state actors alike. America's present global predominance does not render it immune from these dangers. To the contrary, U. S. preeminence makes the American homeland more appealing as a target, while America's openness and freedoms make it more vulnerable. 6 9 This forecast offers a strikingly different perspective on what "provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States" really means for the nation. Over the past two hundred years, the maritime defense of the homeland has been a function largely overlooked in comparison to the naval strategies embraced by the U. S. In the post September 1 1th environment, Maritime Homeland Security takes on a new, more urgent meaning. The nation's defenders must meet this historic challenge by devising and implementing an effective Maritime Homeland security strategy.
The Coast Guard will likely have important roles and missions in the national strategy developed to counter asymmetric threats presently threatening the nation's maritime borders. With its current organizational competence, legal authorities, and substantial linkages to civil response and law enforcement agencies, the Coast Guard is the right agency, at the right time, to fill the right mission of Maritime Homeland Security, especially coastal defense functions. Its bid to replace capital infrastructure is critically important to the nation's ability to protect its vital interest and requires full support and integration with the other armed services.
It is clear that the threat to the homeland is real and strong, but the present defense is weak in the maritime sector. As DOD stands up U.S. Northern Command, the logical and best organization to fill the maritime defense role with minimal overall disruption and maximum connectivity, through the full spectrum of maritime security, is the U. S. Coast The biggest difference in the two constructs is that JCS takes a view of the entire nation whereas OSD seems to be more parochial and centered on defense protection and preparedness. 
